

Onderwerp: RE: [EXT] Re: : Request for comment – NXP components found in Russian drones
Datum: dinsdag 28 oktober 2025 om 16:44:12 Midden-Europese standaardtijd
Van: Martijn van der Linden
Aan: Marcia Nieuwenhuis
Bijlagen: image001.png

Goedemiddag Marcia, NXP houdt het bij het formele statement dat ik je heb gestuurd.
Met vriendelijke groet,
Martijn

From: Marcia Nieuwenhuis <Marcia.Nieuwenhuis@rtl.nl>
Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2025 11:30 AM
To: Martijn van der Linden <martijn.van.der.linden@nxp.com>
Subject: [EXT] Re: : Request for comment – NXP components found in Russian drones

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Beste Martijn,

Dank voor de mail. Kan het zijn dat er iets mis is gegaan? Ik had veertien vragen gesteld maar zie op het gros geen antwoord. We willen graag een nauwkeurige reconstructie maken van hoe het nu toch kan dan die chips van NXP terechtkomen in Russische wapens.

Ik lees dat NXP zichzelf als de beste van de klas beschouwt gezien de opmerking "best of class". Dan neem ik aan dat toen het NXP ter ore kwam dat er toch NXP-onderdelen in Russische aanvalsdrones terecht zijn gekomen er ook meteen is uitgezocht via welke leverancier dit kan zijn gelopen? Dit ook om uit te sluiten dat deze weg nogmaals wordt bewandeld.

Graag ontvang ik voor morgen 10.00 uur per vraag een antwoord in plaats van een algemeen statement. Wij zullen in onze uitingen ook melding maken van hoe jullie onze vragen wel/niet hebben beantwoord, bijvoorbeeld door de vragen en antwoorden als bijlage toe te voegen in de verantwoording. Ook horen we graag of jullie bereid zijn om een toelichting te geven voor camera.

Met vriendelijke groeten
Marcia Nieuwenhuis

Van: Martijn van der Linden <martijn.van.der.linden@nxp.com>

Verzonden: dinsdag, oktober 28, 2025 11:02 AM

Aan: Marcia Nieuwenhuis <Marcia.Nieuwenhuis@rtl.nl>

Onderwerp: FW: : Request for comment – NXP components found in Russian drones

Hi Marcia, hierbij onze reactie op de vragen die je eerder per mail stelde.
Met vriendelijke groet,
Martijn

NXP does not tolerate the use of NXP products in Russian, North Korean or Iran-made military systems or any other application our products were not designed or licensed for, nor has NXP been found to have violated any export control or sanction laws.

We are committed to complying with the law and we work diligently to ensure our products are not improperly diverted to embargoed countries including Russia, Iran, North Korea and Belarus or otherwise used in weapons and systems for which they were not designed or intended. Our team is in ongoing contact with regulators around the world on this issue, working within an industry-wide effort to prevent illegal chip diversion.

We have been and continue to work closely with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this matter. At NXP, we take this issue very seriously and have implemented a comprehensive due diligence program, which is considered 'best of class' by governments. Our data indicates that no products have been imported into Russia, though it is not feasible to track each individual chip and how they become illegally resold.

Van: Marcia Nieuwenhuis <Marcia.Nieuwenhuis@rtl.nl>

Datum: vrijdag, 24 oktober 2025 om 13:19

Aan: pr@nxp.com <pr@nxp.com>

Onderwerp: Request for comment – NXP components found in Russian drones

Dear Mr Silverman, Ms Lempart, Ms Iven,

My name is Marcia Nieuwenhuis and I am an investigative journalist with RTL Nieuws in the Netherlands.

For an ongoing investigation into the presence of Western-made technology in Russian weapons systems, we have identified several NXP components reportedly found in drones used by the Russian military. These components include chips with recent production dates attributed to NXP.

Our analysis also shows that several of the identified NXP components have **production dates a long time after February 2022**, when export restrictions on dual-use technologies to Russia were significantly tightened.

This indicates that, despite these sanctions — which explicitly prohibit such products from being exported or ending up in Russia, whether directly or indirectly — **the sanctions mechanisms have not been fully effective in practice**, or that **circumvention routes** remain in place.

Below are a few examples of NXP components reportedly found in Russian drones, listed from newest to oldest:

# Chip & ID	Production Description date
1 Microcontroller MIMXRT1052 CVL5B 1N04V CTBD2417M (ID 6185)	Week 17 of NXP Semiconductors (Netherlands) 2024 (Apr microcontroller found in a “Shahed-136” UAV (serial no. 13084).
2 Microcontroller MIMXRT1052 CVL5B 1N04V CTBZ2411H (ID 5412)	Week 11 of NXP Semiconductors (Netherlands) 2024 (Mar microcontroller found in a “Gerbera” UAV.
3 Microcontroller MIMXRT1052 CVL5B 1N04V CTBD2330M (ID 6224)	Week 30 of NXP Semiconductors (Netherlands) 2023 (Jul microcontroller found in a “Shahed-136” UAV (serial no. 13678).
4 Microcontroller LPC1768FBD100 AYD870000 SSD2217C (ID 5572)	Week 17 of 32-bit NXP Semiconductors (Netherlands) 2022 (Apr microcontroller found in a “Supercam-S150” UAV.

Considering these findings and as the export of dual-use technology to Russia has been restricted under European Union sanctions since 2014 — and significantly expanded in 2022 — I would appreciate your response to the following questions:

1. Does NXP recognize the specific chip types or serial/markings codes mentioned above? Are these indeed made by NXP?
2. How does NXP explain that components with recent production dates appear to have been found in Russian drones, despite existing EU and international sanctions?
3. Can NXP confirm whether it maintains traceability of its products after the point of sale, for example through batch or serial number tracking systems? If not, does NXP consider this a limitation in enforcing export-control compliance?
4. Please provide us - as detailed as possible - how these four new components could end up in Russia.
5. Has NXP shared internal findings or transaction data with European or Dutch authorities investigating sanctions evasion involving dual-use goods?
6. Does NXP have insight into which distributors or intermediaries may have supplied these components, directly or indirectly, to Russia?
7. How many distributors does NXP currently work with globally, and have any of them been suspended or terminated due to sanctions compliance concerns? If so, how many?
8. What export-control and compliance measures has NXP implemented since 2014 to prevent its products from ending up in Russia or in military

applications?

9. Have these measures been strengthened or modified since February 2022?
10. Has NXP detected any changes in its sales or distribution data that could suggest altered supply routes or new types of buyers? If these chips are mainly purchased by well-known manufacturers, that seems straightforward — but the lack of transparency around bulk buyers or trading companies could present a higher leakage risk. Are NXP's compliance measures focused on identifying such risks?
11. Is NXP cooperating with European or Dutch authorities to monitor potential re-exports of its products through third countries (such as Hong Kong, Turkey, Cyprus or the UAE)?
12. Given the discovery of NXP components in Russian drones despite existing sanctions, does NXP consider that the current international export-control framework requires strengthening or improved enforcement?
- 13.
14. What steps does NXP believe governments and the semiconductor industry should take to strengthen oversight and prevent such components from being diverted in the future?
14. On the Ukrainian side there were able to recover 123 components components. Attached is a list of NXP components identified in Russian drones and weapons systems that have **no production date listed** in the Ukrainian government's database. Could NXP please verify or provide the **manufacturing dates** (or approximate production periods) for these components? How many of these components are from after the invasion?

 [NXP_Components_Without_Production_Dates.xlsx](#)

We would like to include NXP's response in our reporting. Could you please provide your reply by **Monday 27 October, 18:00 CET**?

Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation.

Kind regards,

Marcia Nieuwenhuis

**Marcia
Nieuwenhuis**

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